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Abstract
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents
have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied
to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of
the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in the labor market and im-
proved contraception on female education, employment, and timing of first births
after World War II. We find that the diffusion of the pill might have played an
important role in explaining the observed rise in female education and employment
since the 1960s. But without equal opportunities, these changes would have not
occurred.
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1. Introduction
This paper develops a new equilibrium marriage model of two-sided search where ex-ante
heterogenous individuals have multiple characteristics. In the existing search literature,
the restriction to a single characteristic is almost universal as the aggregation problem is
severe. Heterogeneous singles use different match strategies and equilibrium requires that
each individual’s strategy must be a best response to the aggregated match strategies of
the opposite sex. We use our extended equilibrium approach to provide new insights on
the separate impacts of equal opportunities for women in the labor market and improved
contraceptive technologies on female education choice, labor market participation rates,
and the timing of first births.
It takes time in the marriage market to find the right life-partner. Furthermore
singles who choose to be more selective in their choice of life-partner inevitably delay the
time at which they might successfully match. Of course more popular singles, those who
receive many proposals, might afford to be relatively selective. Following seminal work
by Becker (1973, 1974), there is a large literature on equilibrium marriage markets with
random search, e.g. Lu and McAfee (1996), Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999), Eeckhout
(1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Chade (2001), Chade and Ventura (2002), Smith (2006),
Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2010), Coles and Francesconi (2011), and Dı´az-Gime´nez
and Giolito (2013). Much of this literature considers when equilibrium might generate
positive assortative matching.1 An equilibrium search framework, however, is also ideal
to analyze how changes in labor market opportunities and contraceptive technologies
affect marriage market outcomes and female labor supply.
After World War II, the U.S. labor market witnessed dramatic changes in female
education choice and female participation rates. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) describe
how the development of infant formula and improved medication freed the nursing mother
from the home. With households increasingly sustained by new labor-saving appliances
and a doubling of real wages from the mid 1930s to 1960, married women in the 1950s
had a strong incentive to substitute their time to the booming labor market (Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Vandenbrouke 2005; Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005).2
1The marriage market approach typically assumes non-transferable utility. A labor market context
instead assumes utility is transferable with Nash bargaining. Contributions in this literature include
Burdett and Coles (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000), Teuling and Gautier (2004), Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011), and Jacquemet and Robin (2013). See Coles and Francesconi (2011) for a discussion of the two
approaches.
2Among the empirical studies that emphasize a positive impact of wartime work on women’s em-
ployment, see Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004), and Goldin and Olivetti (2013).
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But many firms at that time implemented discriminatory employment practices to-
ward women. For instance, prior to the 1950s, “marriage bars” in occupations such as
doctors, lawyers, teachers, and clerks, were commonly used to restrict the employment
prospects of women. Kessler-Harris (1982, 2001) and Goldin (1990, 1991) provide fas-
cinating accounts of women’s struggle for equal opportunities in the U.S. labor market.
Changes in public policies and attitudes affected female labor market behavior, occu-
pations, and earnings (Beller 1982; Harrison 1988; Rosen 2000; Costa 2000; Fernandez,
Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Goldin 2006). In this paper, we refer to the combination of
technological developments in the home (which freed women from domestic chores), the
labor market legislative reforms (culminating in the 1963 Equal Pay Act and the 1964
Civil Rights Act) and the underlying political and cultural environment in which they
were conceived (e.g., the Commission on the Status of Women, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and the growth of feminism), as “the arrival of equal oppor-
tunities for women”.
Following Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) and Fernandez, Guner, and Know-
les (2005), we assume household consumption is a joint public good and match payoffs
depend on “love”, considered as match specific random draws.3 Our model not only
identifies the distribution effects arising from the arrival of equal opportunities, it also
considers the differential impact of different female attributes on female education choice.
For example, men have long placed a high value on female beauty. But the arrival of equal
opportunities allows the highly talented (and well paid) single woman to bring something
more to the marriage. Our framework therefore allows us to consider how non-economic
factors, such as beauty, might affect the female incentive to invest in college education.
Similarly, it is well known that educated women, on average, marry later and have their
first child later (Hotz, Klerman, and Willis 1997; Goldin and Katz 2002). Young women
will then take all such factors into account when making their education choices.
An important, new feature of the paper is that it focuses on women’s age at first
birth rather than age at first marriage as the measure of partnership formation. Age at
first birth is not only consistently measured over decades, it is also arguably the point at
which a long-term partnership is truly cemented. By restricting attention to women who
ever had a child, we find that the distribution of age at first birth in the United States
has hardly changed since 1830. This is intriguing as there have been both dramatic
3The first example of an equilibrium two-sided search model with idiosyncratic match payoffs is
Burdett and Wright (1998).
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changes in female fertility, education and labor market participation choices over the
previous century, and radical improvements in contraceptive technologies.
Focusing on age at first birth also reveals a novel insight into match behavior. Using
data from the 2000 U.S. Census we find that, conditional on having a child, the average
age at first birth is 28.4 years among college educated women and 23.3 years among
non-college women. Yet the standard deviation of age at first birth is the same for
the two groups of women, at about 4.6 years. This is surprising: should educated
women have considerably longer search spells, one would have expected such spells to
exhibit also a greater standard deviation. Of course heterogeneity in match rates implies
the estimated standard deviation is not an unbiased estimate of the average completed
search spell. Nevertheless, we find that the gap between the average match spell and
the measured standard deviation is always small (by birth cohort and within a given
education category). This result strongly suggests that college educated and non-college
educated women experience roughly the same average search spells. From this we infer
that the gap in age at first birth arises as female college students delay entry into the
marriage market until after they complete their studies (see also Lundberg and Pollak
2013).
We also consider how contraceptive innovations affect labor market outcomes. As
pointed out by Goldin and Katz (2002, p. 765), it is hard empirically to separate out
the effect of the birth control pill (“the pill”) from the contemporaneous surge of femi-
nism and the emergence of equal opportunities during the 1960s and 1970s. There was,
however, another major contraceptive innovation earlier in the 20th century. Following
the discovery of a new latex production technology in 1919, the top fifteen U.S. con-
dom manufacturers were, by 1931, producing 1.44 million latex condoms per day (Tone
2001). Noting this innovation occurred prior to the arrival of equal opportunities, it is
interesting it did not have a significant impact on female economic activity.4 We argue
the difference in impact of the pill and the latex condom on female education and labor
market participation rates is due to the existence, or otherwise, of equal opportunities
for women. In other words, the effect of the pill on female behavior is best understood
as an interaction effect with the arrival of equal opportunities.
The next section describes some key motivating facts. Section 3 describes an equi-
4Going further back in time, the invention of vulcanized rubber in 1844 also resulted in more re-
liable and cheaper condoms (Guinnane 2011). Vulcanized rubber was also used for the production of
diaphragms and other barrier methods in the late nineteenth century. None of these innovations turned
out to have an effect on the distribution of the age at first birth.
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librium marriage model of two-sided search with multiple attributes and section 4 es-
tablishes existence of equilibrium for the general case. Section 5 considers a special case
which directly addresses the impact of equal opportunities and of innovations in contra-
ceptive technologies on female economic activity. Section 6 illustrates those issues with
a numerical example and Section 7 concludes. The census and survey data used in our
analysis are described in the Appendix.
2. Motivating Facts
The removal of marriage bars had a gradual, but major, impact on female labor supply.
For example, in 1920, only one in ten of all married women in the labor force were teachers
and clerical workers. By 1970, that proportion had risen to 40 percent. Figure 1 shows
the employment rates of all women aged 25–34 depending on their marital status and
motherhood. Single (never married) women in this age group have always had relatively
high labor market participation rates. Indeed, since 1940, the participation rate of these
women has remained stable at about 80 percent. In contrast, following the 1950s, there
was a dramatic surge in the labor market participation rates of young married women,
and especially those of young mothers.
Career options had a large impact on the return to education. Rather than antici-
pating to be in the labor market for only a few years while single and childless, young
women could instead expect a lifelong return to investing in a qualification. Over the
period 1940–2009, Figure 2 reports the fraction of women aged 25–34 with a college ed-
ucation and so describes the average education choice of women in the 15–24 age group
made in the previous decade. As young women anticipated working more in the labor
market, more chose to invest in a college education.5 Taken together, Figures 1 and 2
demonstrate the coincident increase in female education and employment following the
1950s.
Given this radical change in female economic activity, one might expect a similarly
large change in the timing of first births. It is well documented that there has been a long-
run decline in fertility (Guinnane 2011). Moreover, Bailey (2006) finds that early legal
access to the pill reduced the probability of a birth before age 22 by about 15 percent.
Yet if we consider the whole population of women who ever had a child, the story is quite
5This structure suggests increasing returns to scale in lifetime earnings: a doubling of a woman’s
participation rate and of her investment in education more than doubles her expected lifetime earnings.
This non-convexity can generate very large substitution effects.
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different. Conditional on women who had their first child by age 40,6 Figure 3 shows
the median age at first birth has been remarkably stable, being around 23.5 years ever
since the 1830s. That the 10-th and the 90-th percentiles have also been stable suggests
the entire distribution has been largely invariant to the increase in female education and
participation rates. Perhaps even more surprisingly, this distribution is also invariant to
the decline in fertility and major improvements in contraceptive technologies, including
the pill during the 1960s and 1970s and the latex condom during the 1920s and 1930s.
Figure 1 establishes the latex condom innovation had no (or, at best, only a modest)
impact on female labor market participation rates.7
3. The Model
Basic Setup
We consider a continuous-time, infinite horizon family formation model with frictions.
Only steady state equilibria are considered. There are two sexes, male and female indexed
by s = m, f respectively, and a continuum of agents of both sexes. All partnerships
involve one man and one woman and there is an equal measure of unpartnered men and
women in the singles market. The parameter λ > 0 denotes the rate at which any single
meets a potential partner of the opposite sex. For simplicity, all agents are infinitely
lived, they discount the future at rate r > 0, and partnerships last forever (no divorce).
Each male is described by a vector of characteristics xm ∈ Ωm, and each female is
characterized by xf ∈ Ωf . Should a male xm match with a female xf , the male obtains
payoff Um(xm, xf )+θ
m/r, while the female enjoys payoff Uf (xm, xf )+θ
f/r. Um and Uf are
bounded functions for all (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ) and describe their attribute-dependent
payoffs. Each θs, s = m, f , represents a “love” draw, considered as an independent
random draw from the exogenous c.d.f. H(·) with support [θ, θ]. For ease of exposition,
we assume θ = +∞, although none of the results hinges on this assumption. We assume
the surplus function S(θ˜) =
∫ +∞
θ˜
[1−H(θ)]dθ exists and note it is a positive, continuous,
decreasing and convex function with limθ˜→+∞ S(θ˜) = 0. The flow payoff while single is
um(xm) ≥ 0 for males and uf (xf ) ≥ 0 for females, which are bounded functions for all
6This choice of age cutoff is driven by data availability. See the Appendix.
7Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) find the contribution of reduced fertility in explaining long-term changes
in female employment is small. Comparatively little is known about the relationship between age at
first birth and mother’s labor force participation and education choices. Early descriptive work includes
Happel, Hill, and Low (1984) and Cigno and Ermisch (1989). Since the 1960s, childbearing has shifted
to later ages (e.g., Hotz, Klerman, and Willis 1997; Francesconi 2002), but much of this empirical work
does not focus on the changes in first birth distributions over a long time horizon.
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(xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ).
Let Gm(xm) describe the distribution of male attributes xm across single men and
Gf (xf ) denote the distribution of female attributes xf . There are search frictions and
contacts are random. Should a single male xm meet a single woman, her attributes are
considered a random draw from Gf (·). Similarly from her perspective, his attributes xm
are a random draw from Gm(·). Given a contact, each observes the other’s attributes
and draws his/her independent love values, θm or θf . A match is formed only if both
agree to it, otherwise they separate and continue searching.
If two singles agree to form a match, they permanently exit the singles market and
have two children, a son who inherits his father’s characteristics xm, and a daughter
who inherits her mother’s characteristics xf . As we only consider steady states, there
is no further loss in generality by assuming each child instantaneously grows up and
immediately enters the singles market. Burdett and Coles (1999) refer to this as the
‘clones assumption’.8 The clones assumption is convenient as it implies the population
distribution of singles is invariant to the match strategies of singles. It thus usefully
abstracts from inter-cohort competition for partners: by accepting a match and exiting
the pool of singles, the clones rule implies this decision does not affect the match op-
portunities of future singles. The approach is relevant as the birth cohort distribution
is then endogenously determined. For example, types who never marry, and so do not
have children, are absent from the birth cohort. Conversely, those who match quickly
are over-represented in the birth cohort.
Preliminaries
Let V m(xm) denote the value of a single male with attributes xm, and V
f (xf ) be the value
of a single female with characteristics xf . Given contact with female xf , the single male
xm will propose a long term relationship as long as his match payoff Um(xm, xf ) + θ
m/r
exceeds the value of remaining single V m(xm). This yields a reservation love value
θ˜m = r
[
V m(xm)− Um(xm, xf )
]
,
where the single male will propose if and only if θm ≥ θ˜m. Note this reservation match
value is type specific; i.e. θ˜m = θ˜m(xf |xm) describes the reservation match strategy of
8An alternative is to assume each child’s attribute is a mix of his/her parent’s characteristics plus
a random element. Similarly, one might wish to endogenize the fertility choice. Both extensions are
potentially important research projects, but go beyond the scope of the current paper.
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each male xm. The male match propensity
Pm(xf |xm) = 1−H(θ˜m) (1)
thus describes the probability with which a male xm will propose to a female xf given
contact. Note that any attribute xf which raises the male match payoff Um(xm, xf )
implies a one-for-one fall in the reservation love value θ˜m(xf |xm) and thus a higher
match propensity.
The same argument applies for women. Given contact with male xm, the single
female xf has reservation love value
θ˜f = r
[
V f (xf )− Uf (xf , xm)
]
,
and her match propensity
P f (xm|xf ) = 1−H(θ˜f ), (2)
describes the probability with which she is willing to match with male xm. Any charac-
teristic xm which raises the female match payoff Uf (xf , xm) implies the woman is more
likely to propose a match.
Given these match propensities, we now determine the set of values V s(·) for each
xs ∈ Ωs, s = m, f . Recall that each single male meets a potential female partner at rate
λ whose trait xf is considered a random draw from Gf (·). Standard arguments imply
V m(xm) is identified by the Bellman equation:
rV m(xm) = um(xm) + λ
∫
xf∈Ωf
Πm(xm, xf )P
f (xm|xf )dGf (xf ),
where
Πm(xm, xf ) =
∫ θ
θ
max
[
Um(xm, xf ) + θ
m/r − V m(xm), 0
]
dH(θm). (3)
Random matching implies the male contacts a single female xf ∈ Ωf at rate λdGf (xf ),
who is willing to match with probability P f (xm|xf ), and he then makes expected surplus
Πm(xm, xf ) by the contact, where that surplus depends on whether his realised match
payoff Um(·)+θm/r exceeds V m(·). Integrating (3)by parts implies Πm(xm, xf ) = S(θ˜m),
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where θ˜m is his reservation love value. Hence, V m = V m(xm) solves
rV m = um(xm) +
λ
r
∫
xf∈Ωf
S
(
r
[
V m − Um(xm, xf )
] )
P f (xm|xf )dGf (xf ). (4)
Equation (4) is key. For any male xm ∈ Ωm and corresponding female proposal strategies
P f (·) ∈ [0, 1], (4) is an implicit function for V m. The right hand side of (4) is strictly
positive at V m = 0 and is a continuous decreasing function which limits to um(xm) as
V m → ∞. It follows that V m(xm) always exists, is unique, and satisfies V m(xm) ≥
um(xm)/r.
By symmetry, V f = V f (xf ) is given by
rV f = uf (xf ) +
λ
r
∫
xm∈Ωm
S
(
r
[
V f − Uf (xf , xm)
] )
Pm(xf |xm)dGm(xm). (5)
Expressions (4) and (5) thus uniquely determine the value of being single for each sex,
given the match propensities of the opposite sex.
In the application of Sections 5 and 6, we focus on female education choice after
the emergence of equal opportunities for women. As the model demonstrates, each
woman’s investment in education not only takes into account the direct financial ben-
efits and costs of investing in education (i.e., how it affects the flow value of being
single uf (xf ) and the expected value of marriage Uf (·)), but also on how it affects mar-
riage prospects Pm(xf |xm). Of course, the collective change in female match strategies
P f (xm|xf ) through the introduction of equal opportunities also changes the value of
being a single man V m = V m(xm) and thus changes the entire match structure.
Before defining and establishing the existence of equilibrium, it is useful to detail
how changes in match strategies affect agent values. Specifically, consider a woman xf
and two different match strategies by men, Pm1 (·) and Pm0 (·). Let V f1 (xf ) and V f0 (xf )
denote the solutions to (5) with Pm being equal to Pm1 and P
m
0 , respectively.
Lemma 1. If Pm1 (xf |xm) ≥ Pm0 (xf |xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm, then V f1 (xf ) ≥ V f0 (xf ).
Lemma 1 simply says that a woman xf is better off when all men are more likely to
propose to her. The result follows immediately from (5). For any given V f and noting
the surplus function is positive, the right hand side of this expression is increasing in
Pm. Thus, V f solving (5) must increase with an increase in Pm.
Lemma 1 is important as it allows us to identify an upper bound for the value for
each sex. Clearly, by Lemma 1, the ideal situation for each male xm is that all women
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are willing to match with him; i.e., P f = 1 for all xf ∈ Ωf . Now consider his ideal match
x∗f defined as
x∗f (xm) = arg max
xf∈Ωf
Um(xm, xf ).
It follows that V m(xm) ≤ V m(xm), where
rV
m
= um(xm) +
λ
r
S
(
r
[
V
m − Um(xm, x∗f )
] )
, (6)
as V
m
describes the value of being single in a market where all women want to propose
to him and every woman is also his ideal match, i.e., xf = x
∗
f , for all xf ∈ Ωf . The
assumptions on S(·) guarantee that V m defined by (6) exists and V m ≥ um(xm)/r. The
above analysis has thus established the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any male xm ∈ Ωm and female proposal strategies P f (·) ∈ [0, 1], the
solution for V m(xm) exists, is unique, and is bounded with
V m(xm) ∈
[um(xm)
r
, V
m
(xm)
]
.
Armed with Lemmas 1 and 2, we are now in a position to define and establish the
existence of an equilibrium.
4. Equilibrium
A Matching Equilibrium requires the set of values V m and V f are consistent with the
match propensities Pm and P f of the opposite sex, while those match propensities Pm
and P f are optimal given V m and V f . That is, equilibrium is the set of functions
{Pm, P f , V m, V f} over (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ) which satisfy the functional equations
(1)–(2) and (4)–(5).
Existence is established by considering the following fixed point problem. Suppose
V mk (·) = V m(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm describes the equilibrium set of male values. Equation
(1) then implies the equilibrium male match propensities
Pmk (xf |xm) = 1−H
(
r[V mk (xm)− Um(xm, xf )]
)
, (7)
for each xm ∈ Ωm. Given these male match propensities Pmk (·), the Bellman equation
(5) then uniquely yields V f (xf ) for each xf ∈ Ωf . Let V fk (·) denote this solution. Given
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V f = V fk (·), equation (2) then yields female match propensities
P fk (·) = 1−H
(
r[V fk (xf )− Uf (xf , xm)]
)
. (8)
Of course given these female match propensities P fk (·), (4) then uniquely determines
V m(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm. Let V mk+1(·) denote this updated solution. The above thus
identifies a functional mapping V mk+1(xm) = T [V
m
k (xm)]. Equilibrium requires finding its
fixed point where V m(xm) = T [V
m(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm. The existence proof uses the
following monotonicity property.
Lemma 3. [Monotonicity] If V mk (xm) ≥ V mk+1(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm, then T [V mk (xm)] ≥
T [V mk+1(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm.
Proof. As H(·) is an increasing function, V mk (xm) ≥ V mk+1(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm and (7)
implies Pmk (·) ≤ Pmk+1(·) for all xm ∈ Ωm, xf ∈ Ωf . Lemma 1 establishes V fk (.) ≤ V fk+1(.)
for all xf ∈ Ωf . As H(·) is an increasing function, V fk (·) ≤ V fk+1(·) for all xf ∈ Ωf and
(8) implies P fk (·) ≥ P fk+1(·) for all xf ∈ Ωf , xm ∈ Ωm. Lemma 1 establishes T [V mk (xm)] ≥
T [V mk+1(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm and so the map T [·] is monotonic. 
The proof of Lemma 3 reflects the following structure of the model. When all single
men are better off, each man becomes more selective in the marriage market: given
a contact with a single woman, each male proposes with a lower probability. Lemma
1 then implies every single woman is worse off as it is harder for her to find a male
who is willing to form a permanent partnership. Now, when all single women are worse
off, each becomes less selective in the marriage market and their match propensities
increase. Lemma 1 then implies every single man is better off. The proof of Lemma
3 uses this feedback mechanism to establish monotonicity of the map T [V ]. But these
feedback effects also suggest multiple equilibria may be possible where men, say, prefer
an equilibrium in which women are less selective (and men more selective) while women
prefer another equilibrium in which men are less selective (and women more selective).
Establishing existence of an equilibrium is now straightforward.
Theorem 1. A Matching Equilibrium exists.
Proof. Existence follows by repeated iteration of the map V mk+1(xm) = T [V
m
k (xm)], start-
ing at the upper bound V m0 (·) = V m(·). As V m1 (xm) = T [V m0 (xm)] ≤ V m(xm) for all
xm ∈ Ωm, Lemma 3 and an induction argument imply a sequence of decreasing values
V mk+1(xm) ≤ V mk (xm) for each xm ∈ Ωm, k = 0, 1, 2, ... As this sequence is bounded below
by um(xm)/r, a limit point exists for every xm ∈ Ωm. As this limiting set of values is
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the required fixed point, an equilibrium must exist. This completes the proof of the
Theorem. 
The proof of Theorem 1 suggests a straightforward numerical procedure which is
guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium, although there is no guarantee that the equi-
librium is unique. It is worth stressing, however, that if multiple equilibria exist where all
men prefer one equilibrium (labeled as equilibrium 1) over another (equilibrium 2), then
monotonicity implies the above iteration will converge to equilibrium 1. Conversely, if we
were to start the iteration at the lower bound, where V m0 (·) = um(xm)/r, monotonicity
implies the iteration would instead converge to equilibrium 2.
Time to Partnership by Birth Cohort
Each single woman xf ∈ Ωf matches at equilibrium rate
λf (xf ) = λ
∫
xm∈Ωm
P f (xm|xf )Pm(xf |xm)dGm(xm),
where matching requires a double coincidence of wants. The clones rule implies the gross
inflow of new single females is
g =
∫
xf∈Ωf
λf (xf )dG
f (xf ).
If Φf (xf ) denotes the distribution of characteristics xf across each female birth cohort,
then
dΦf (xf ) =
λf (xf )dG
f (xf )
g
.
Individuals who match rapidly (i.e., have higher λf (xf )) are over-represented in the
birth cohort. Conversely those who never match are absent from the birth cohort. As
each individual xf has expected unmatched spell equal to 1/λf (xf ) then the average
unmatched spell across all women in any given birth cohort is
µf =
∫
xf∈Ωf
1
λf (xf )
dΦf (xf ) = 1/g.
The same argument applies equally to men. As g describes both the inflow of new
single men and new single women it follows that, by birth cohort, the average unmatched
spell must be the same for both sexes. This is interesting because, as in Burdett and Coles
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(1997), equilibrium can have the property that all men marry (i.e., λm = λm(xm) > 0 for
all xm ∈ Ωm), while some women never marry (i.e., λf = λf (xf ) = 0, for some xf ∈ Ωf ).
In that case and across the entire population, the average time to partnership for women
must be greater than that for men (in fact, it is unboundedly large). But this cannot
occur when restricting attention to birth cohorts where population weights are scaled by
match frequencies.
Although the mean unmatched spell must be the same across sexes in any given birth
cohort, the variance is different as
σ2f =
∫
xf∈Ωf
[
2
λf (xf )
2
]
dΦf (xf )−
[
1
g
]2
=
1
g
∫
xf∈Ωf
[
2
λf (xf )
− 1
g
]
dGf (xf ),
and thus it depends on λf (·). Obviously, σf = 1/g when all individuals match at the
same rate, that is, when λf (xf ) = g for all xf ∈ Ωf . As 1/λf is a convex function of λf ,
however, disperse match rates imply σf > 1/g, and this raises the standard deviation of
time to first partnership. The estimated standard deviation of age at first partnership,
both for men and for women, thus identifies an upper bound for the average search spell,
1/g.
5. An Application: Equal Opportunities and the Pill
We use the model of Section 3 to understand changes in women’s behavior due to the
emergence of equal opportunities and the diffusion of the pill. To focus on female behav-
ior, we keep the male side of the market deliberately simple. Each male is characterized
by a scalar, xm = {y}, which describes his labor market earnings. Earnings across single
men have distribution Gm(·) and support [y, y].
Each single woman is described by a pair of attributes xf = (n, α). The term α
denotes an ability variable that identifies her potential earnings in the labor market,
while n captures her innate attractiveness to the opposite sex. Goldin and Katz (2002)
describe n as nurturing skills, Burdett and Coles (1997) describe it as pizzazz, and Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite et al. (1993) develop an “aristocratic” equilibrium where n
describes aristocratic rank. Here we refer to n as attractiveness or desirability, where a
higher n raises the male payoff to the match. Let G˜f (·) denote the ex-ante distribution
of attributes (n, α) across single women.
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Each woman (n, α) makes an education choice e ∈ {0, 1} prior to entering the mar-
riage market, with e = 1 indicating university education and e = 0 otherwise. For
convenience, we refer to the first group as college educated and to the second as college
uneducated. The cost of educational investment, which is the same for all, is denoted
by c, c > 0. Given this choice, her wage w in the labor market is: (i) w = y if there
are unequal labor market opportunities, (ii) w = α if there are equal opportunities and
e = 0 (uneducated), (iii) w = γα if there are equal opportunities and e = 1 (educated),
where γ > 1 describes the wage return to education. As the education choice is sunk
ex-post, each woman in the marriage market is described by her ex-post characteristics
(n,w). Hence, given the ex-ante distribution of female characteristics G˜f (n, α), the op-
timal education choices of women yield Gf (n,w) defined as the distribution of ex-post
female attributes (n,w) in the marriage market.
Family consumption is assumed to be a joint public good and joint labor supply is
chosen efficiently. A match between a male y and a female (n,w) yields the following
lifetime payoffs:
Um =
β [y + max[w − φ, 0]] + n+ F
r
; U f =
β [y + max[w − φ, 0]] + F
r
,
where β, φ, and F are positive parameters. The male’s flow payoff in the match depends
on joint labor market earnings y+ max[w−φ, 0] where φ describes the opportunity cost
of child care, i.e., the female partner continues in the labor market if her earnings w ≥ φ.
We assume φ > y, so that a married woman who only earns y will not participate in the
labor market and so becomes a “homemaker”. Conversely, a high earning woman with
w > φ will participate and purchase child services at cost φ.9 Joint earnings are deflated
by β, 0 < β ≤ 1. The case β = 1 assumes “two can live as cheaply as one”, while β
below 1 embeds an equivalence scale greater than one: that is, partners raising a family
on joint income y can afford the same lifestyle as a single on income βy. F describes the
flow utility yielded by raising a family and is assumed to be the same for both sexes.10
The female match payoff has an identical structure, the only difference being that
her match payoff does not depend on her own desirability n. Her attractiveness thus in-
creases her partner’s match payoff but does not directly increase her own. Single women,
9An alternative specification, as considered in Coles and Francesconi (2011), is that the higher earner
participates in the labor market, while the lower earner only works if the added earnings compensate
for child care costs.
10Allowing F to be gender specific is potentially important, but this is an extension left to future
research.
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however, benefit from having greater attractiveness as this improves their chances of at-
tracting a more desirable mate.
The flow payoff of a single male is um(y) = y+ u, whereas the flow payoff to a single
woman is uf (n,w) = w + u. Following Goldin and Katz (2002), we assume improved
contraception raises u, the flow value of being single relative to the flow value of marriage;
that is, improved contraception reduces the cost to delaying partnership formation.
Matching Equilibria with Unequal Opportunities
In this context, a labor market with unequal opportunities means a woman can only
earn wage y. This can be considered as an extreme version of the “marriage bar”.
As child care costs φ > y, each married woman optimally becomes a homemaker.
The match payoffs for men and women in this case reduce respectively to
Um =
βy + n+ F
r
; U f =
βy + F
r
.
This payoff structure implies married women withdraw from the labor market to raise
the family. Because the model implies her return to college education is zero, the costly
investment in education is a strictly dominated strategy.
Let V m(y) denote the value of a single male with income y and V f (n) denote the
value of a single female with attractiveness n, noting that her ability α is not payoff
relevant. The analysis for the general case now applies. Given contact with female n, a
single male y has reservation love value θ˜m = rV m(y) − βy − n − F and corresponding
match propensity
Pm(n|y) = 1−H(rV m(y)− βy − n− F ). (9)
Similarly given contact with male y, a single female n has reservation love value θ˜f =
rV f (n)− βy − F and corresponding match propensity
P f (y|n) = 1−H(rV f (n)− βy − F ). (10)
Given (10), the single male y enjoys value V m = V m(y) satisfying
rV m = u+ y +
λ
r
∫ n
n
S(rV m − βy − n− F )P f (y|n)dGf (n), (11)
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where Gf (n) describes the distribution of attractiveness across single women. Likewise
the single female n enjoys value V f = V f (n) satisfying
rV f = u+ y +
λ
r
∫ y
y
S(rV f − βy − F )Pm(n|y)dGm(y). (12)
A Matching Equilibrium is the set of functions {Pm, P f , V m, V f} satisfying the func-
tional equations (9)–(12). Theorem 1 establishes a Matching Equilibrium exists.
As Pm(n|y) increases with n, Lemma 1 implies women are better off with greater
attractiveness because single men are more likely to propose a match. But by raising
their option value of being single, they become more selective: P f (y|n) is decreasing in
n. Marriage in this case is then sorted by attractiveness, where more attractive women
are unlikely to marry low earning men. The overall effect of increased attractiveness on
match rate is ambiguous, however, as men are more willing to match with an attractive
woman while she is more likely to decline their proposal.
So how does improved contraception, considered as an increase in u, affect behavior?
Given unequal labor market opportunities, women have no incentive to invest in a costly
education as each anticipates spending her time in the home sector as a homemaker.
Thus improved contraception, in the absence of equal opportunities, has no impact on
female education rates.
Given the proposal strategies P s(·), s = f,m then, ceteris paribus, an increase in u
implies the value of being single increases. This, however, implies both sexes become
more selective and the corresponding fall in P s(·) makes both sexes worse off. A simple
contradiction argument establishes some singles must become better off as u increases.
But it is not necessarily the case that all must be better off in a matching equilibrium.11
Indeed, we cannot rule out, say, the possibility that an increase in u makes men so
much less willing to commit to a long term partnership, that the advent of improved
contraception makes all women worse off (it becomes much harder to find a committed
long-term male partner).
11A straightforward counterexample exists when H is degenerate. In that case, equilibrium matching
has the class structure as described in Burdett and Coles (1997). An increase in u implies all the class
boundaries shift up and an individual on a boundary is necessarily made worse-off by dropping down a
class.
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Matching Equilibria with Equal Opportunities
With equal opportunities, female investment in education generates two benefits. First,
it improves her own welfare directly (a better standard of living). Second, it improves
her marital prospects. To separate out these two returns to education, define female
“fitness” z as z = n+βmax[w−φ, 0]. The male and female payoffs to a match can then
be rewritten as
Um =
βy + z + F
r
; U f =
βy + βmax[w − φ, 0] + F
r
.
As men now rank women according to their fitness z, rather than their attractiveness n,
it is useful to relabel each female (n,w) by her equivalent characteristics (z, w).
Given the distribution of male earnings Gm(y) and ex-post female characteristics
Gf (z, w), it is easy to formulate the value function for each sex and describe the corre-
sponding match propensities. Theorem 1 then establishes a Matching Equilibrium ex-
ists. What is interesting in this case is characterizing the equilibrium education choices
of women where education choice e ∈ {0, 1} maps female characteristics (n, α) to ex-
post attributes (z, w), noting that male match propensities Pm(z|y) depend only on
female fitness. For convenience, we refer to women with ex-post wage w > φ as “career
women”: career women always participate in the labor market. Women with w < φ, as
in the world with unequal opportunities, are instead referred to as “homemakers”: when
married, homemakers withdraw from the labor market and raise the family.
For a woman with sufficiently high ability, α > φ/γ, investment in education yields
two direct benefits: (i) the increase in earnings raises her standard of living in every
state, that is, she becomes a career woman with w = γα > φ, and (ii) it increases her
fitness in the singles market from z = n + βmax[α − φ, 0] to z = n + β[γα − φ] which,
by increasing male match propensities, improves her chances of finding a good match.
For a woman with lower ability α < φ/γ, investment in education has a very limited
return. This investment does not improve her fitness in the marriage market and so does
not improve her marital prospects. Her return to education is therefore short-lived: it
increases her wage only for the time when she remains single.
A little algebra establishes that the reservation match value of a woman (z, w) given
contact with male y satisfies
θ˜f = u+ w − βy − βmax[w − φ, 0]− F + λ
r
∫ y
y
S(θ˜f )Pm(z|y)dGm(y).
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Consider now a woman with intermediate ability α ∈ [φ/γ, φ]. If she does not invest
in education, her wage α < φ implies she becomes a homemaker upon marriage. Her
reservation match value when e = 0, denoted θ˜f0 , is given by
θ˜f0 = u+ α− βy − F +
λ
r
∫ y
y
S(θ˜f0 )P
m(n|y)dGm(y). (13)
If instead she invests in education, her wage increases to w = γα and her fitness to
z = n+ γα− φ. Her reservation match value in this case becomes
θ˜f1 = u+ [γα− β(γα− φ)]− βy − F +
λ
r
∫ y
y
S(θ˜f1 )P
m(z|y)dGm(y). (14)
There are two differences between these two reservation value equations. First, as
shown in (14), by investing in education, a woman gains greater fitness z > n and so
enjoys improved marital prospects. Second, the opportunity wage cost of forming a
match is different. The uneducated woman in (13) gives up flow income α to become
a homemaker. The college educated woman instead gives up flow income γα but, by
remaining in the labor market, continues to enjoy a share β(γα− φ) of her continuation
earnings. As α < φ, γ > 1, and β ≤ 1, it is easy to show [γα− β(γα− φ)] > α; i.e.
the opportunity wage cost through forming a match is greater for the college educated
woman. Standard arguments imply θ˜f1 > θ˜
f
0 , and educated women are more selective in
the marriage market. This occurs not only because they have a higher opportunity wage
cost to forming a match, but also because they enjoy more proposals.
6. Numerical Example
As the diffusion of the pill coincided with the emergence of (more) equal opportunities for
women in the labor market, it is hard to separate out empirically their effects on female
education and employment rates.12 This section aims to quantify the extent to which
improved contraception additionally enhances female education rates when women face
equal opportunities in the labor market.
12As mentioned in the first two sections, Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) provide empirical
evidence based on strategies which try to identify the impact of the pill. See also Bailey (2010).
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Parametric Specifications
Table 1 describes the baseline parameters and functional forms used in our numerical
example. The choice γ = 1.04 implies a return to education of 4 percent. The income
equivalence scale for a married couple with two children is typically set equal to 2.1 (e.g.,
OECD 2008), which implies β = 1/(2.1) = 0.48.
In the standard job search literature, the exponential distribution of wage offers is
an important special case: for r arbitrarily small, an exogenous fall in the job offer
rate implies the job seeker’s reservation wage falls so that the expected job search spell
remains unchanged (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). Figure 3 shows the family
formation process is consistent with this property: the female distribution of age at first
birth has changed little over the last 150 years, even though society, and particularly the
quality of effective contraception, has changed enormously. To replicate this feature of
the data, we assume H(·) is exponential with parameter δ.
Based on the 2000 U.S. Census data, we assume the distribution of male wages is
lognormal with mean $10.44 and standard deviation $0.687. We truncate the distribution
at two standard deviations from the mean, so that y = $9, 608 and y = $135, 131 per
annum, and renormalize the probability weights appropriately. The distribution of female
abilities is the same, but deflated by γ = 1.04. Thus if all women invest in education,
equal opportunities implies women enjoy the same distribution of wages.
The distribution of female abilities is assumed to be orthogonal to the distribution
of female attractiveness or desirability.13 As there is no objective information on the
distribution of attractiveness n in the population (Buss 2003), we suppose there are just
two levels of attractiveness, {−n
2
, n
2
}, where each type occurs with equal probability.
We use L to label women with low attractiveness, −n
2
, and H to label those with high
attractiveness, n
2
.
The relative magnitude of δ to n determines the extent to which “beauty is in the
eye of the beholder”. If n is large, all men are keen to match with the most attractive
women, while if n is small all men search for their (idiosyncratic) true loves. Due to
the exponential assumption on H(·), 1/δ is the standard deviation of love draws. We
set n = 1/δ, so that the relative magnitudes of these desires are of the same order.
We normalize u = 1/δ, noting that (F − u) describes the net increase in flow utility
through starting a family. Finally, the annual child care cost φ is set to $10,732 per child
13Although Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find evidence of a positive impact of workers’ physical
looks on their earnings, we simplify by abstracting from this effect.
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(Macartney and Laughlin 2011).
The remaining parameters of the model (c, δ, λ, F ) are tied down by requiring the
data generated by the model fit the following moments. First, the education cost c
must ensure 25 percent of women complete college education (in line with the 2000
Census data). Second, the standard deviation of love draws, 1/δ, must be such that the
correlation of pre-marital incomes across matched partners is 0.5.14 Note in particular
that a very small value of 1/δ implies love plays a negligible role in matching. In that
case married couples sort by incomes. At the opposite extreme, a large value of 1/δ
implies love is all and there is then no sorting by incomes. Requiring the correlation of
pre-marital incomes across matched partners is 0.5 thus ties down δ.
Third, the last two parameters (λ, F ) are chosen so that the model generated match
rates are as close as possible to the empirical conditional age at first birth distributions
by birth cohort. For women with high school qualifications or lower, and conditional
on having at least one child, the average age at first birth is 23.3 years with standard
deviation σu = 4.56. For college educated women, the conditional average age is higher,
at 28.4 years, but the corresponding standard deviation is virtually the same, σe = 4.57.
The identification problem, of course, is that age at first birth cannot pin down the time
to match. That these standard deviations are the same, however, suggests that average
match rates by education status may not be very different.
One interpretation of these data is that college educated singles delay search for a
permanent partner until after they complete their studies (Lundberg and Pollak 2013).
For example, we could impose that high school graduates enter the marriage market
at age 18, while college graduates enter at age 22. But a difficulty is that the implied
average time to first birth is sensitive to this arbitrary specification. To identify (λ, F ),
therefore, we calibrate the model only to the standard deviations of the conditional age
at first birth and let the calibrated model back out the average times to match. We thus
search over (λ, F ) to minimize the loss function ` = (σ̂u−4.56)2 +(σ̂e−4.57)2, where the
“hat” denotes the moments generated by the model, requiring all the other parameters
fit the data described above.
14Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) use the correlation between spouses’ years of schooling to
identify marital sorting. Across 34 countries, they find this correlation ranging between 0.32 (Australia)
and 0.76 (Colombia), with an average of 0.60, and for the U.S. they find a correlation of 0.63. Using SIPP
data, Jacquemet and Robin (2012) report a correlation between spouses’ wages of 0.30. With data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Hess (2004) reports a correlation between partners’ observed
income of 0.22. The correlation between partners’ pre-marital wages (y, w) is harder to compute. Our
estimates using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the British Household Panel Survey
range between 0.45 and 0.53.
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Table 2 describes our calibrated parameter values for (c, δ, λ, F ). Table 3 describes the
implied mean and standard deviation of unmatched spells by birth cohort and education.
Model Outcomes
Despite generating wide variation in female match rates (see Figure 4 below), the model
finds σu ' µu and σe ' µe within a birth cohort. As the estimated standard deviation
of age at first birth appears to be a good proxy for the average search spell, the model
suggests the following decomposition of average female behavior. High school graduates
enter the marriage market at age 18.1 years. It takes them, on average, µ̂u = 4.4
years to form a permanent long-term partnership which, with an additional nine month
pregnancy, yields 23.3 years as the average age at first birth. College educated women,
instead, enter the marriage market at age 22.9 years, experience an average unmatched
spell µ̂e = 4.7 years which, following a 9 month pregnancy, translates into 28.4 years as
the average age at first birth.
The implied value for F − u means that each child yields a flow value of $23,850 per
year. This is large and reflects the large child care costs. Love also matters, as otherwise
marital sorting would be more highly correlated by income. The standard deviation of
θ is $8,900 per year, which implies that searching for love is worthwhile.
Obviously it is better for a woman to have higher ability and to be more attrac-
tive. An interesting equilibrium feature with equal opportunities, however, is that the
attractiveness premium VH(α) − VL(α) falls steeply with ability (see Figure 5). When
annuitized at the market rate of 4 percent, the added yearly flow value for an H-type
at α = α is $8,860. As we set n = $8, 900, H-types with low ability seem able to
fully monetize the males’ valuation for their added desirability. They achieve this by
being more selective in the marriage market; i.e., they use their attractiveness to seek
a more favorable match. At the top end of the ability spectrum, however, the added
flow value for an H-type is only $1,562 per year. Though positive, this return is dwarfed
by their earnings. Compared to low ability women, high ability women find increased
attractiveness is not so valuable.
Figure 4 describes the corresponding equilibrium match rates λL(α) and λH(α) by
ex-ante ability. High ability women and highly attractive women both enjoy higher pro-
posal rates. They match, however, at very different rates. Regardless of having low or
high attractiveness, female match rates decline as ability α becomes sufficiently large.
Conversely, for any ability α, match rates always increase with attractiveness. The dif-
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ference is that a high ability woman enjoys high earnings while single and, as marriage
imposes a tax (1−β) on her earnings, she takes time in her search for a favorable match.
In contrast, being highly attractive improves one’s marital opportunities, but that ben-
efit is only realized upon marriage. A highly attractive woman, therefore, “cashes in”
relatively early in order to enjoy sooner a more comfortable married lifestyle.
As the attractiveness premium VH(α)−VL(α) is strongly decreasing in ability, this has
a surprising and interesting implication for female educational choice. In our example,
we find that the top 28 percent ability women with L attractiveness invest in education.
But only the top 22 percent of women in the ability distribution with H attractiveness
invest in education. This gap arises because although the marginal L-investor has lower
ability, and so for her the increase in wage through education is smaller, her corresponding
increase in fitness has a greater impact on her matching prospects.
We now use this numerical simulation to assess the impact of equal opportunities
and advances in contraception technology on market outcomes.
Equal Opportunities — With unequal (zero) opportunities in the labor market, women
do not invest in education. As male preferences then depend only on female desirability
and love, it is no surprise that being more attractive is then very important to single
women. Figure 5 compares equilibrium payoffs VH and VL with unequal opportunities
(the two flat lines) to the payoffs VH(α) and VL(α) obtained with equal opportunities.
To ease interpretation, we report annuitized values at the market rate r = 0.04.
The presence of equal opportunities generates a steep increase in the return to female
ability. It also attenuates the attractiveness premium, i.e., VH − VL falls at every ability
level. The vast majority of women are better off with equal opportunities, especially
those endowed with higher levels of ability. But not all are better off. In particular,
the bottom 13 (and 11) percent in the ability distribution among H-type (and L-type)
women are worse off. This is because, for these lower ability women, the introduction of
equal opportunities brings little value to their labor market prospects and worsens their
prospects in the marriage market.
Improved Birth Technology — Recall that an improved contraceptive technology is con-
sidered as an increase in u, which increases the flow value of being single relative to
the flow value of being married. Given attractiveness n, let α(n|Θ) denote the critical
ability level at which a woman is indifferent to investing in education, where Θ denotes
the parameter set of the model. If this marginal investor chooses not to invest in edu-
22
cation, her ex-post characteristics are z− = n + βmax[α − φ, 0] and w− = α. If instead
she invests in education, her ex-post characteristics are z+ = n + βmax[γα − φ, 0] and
w+ = γα. Thus the marginal investor α is identified by
V f (z+, γα)− V f (z−, α) = c.
Now given an optimal match strategy, the Envelope Theorem implies an increase
in u, ceteris paribus, raises the value of being single, V f (·), proportional to the time
she expects to remain single. Thus, the impact of increased u on the net return to
education V f (z+, γα)− V f (z−, α) is proportional to the difference in the expected time
to marriage for each educational choice. The data and the model, however, indicate that
the average unmatched spells for educated and uneducated women are not very different.
The numerical example finds that increasing u, by itself, has a negligible impact on female
schooling decisions.
This exercise, however, ignores the data interpretation suggested above: that women
who invest in education delay entering the marriage market, from the age of 18.1 years
to the age of 22.9. Suppose for example that, without the pill, flow utility while single
u is $500 per year lower, a decrease of roughly 1.7 percent of average male earnings.
Consistency requires us to adjust the education cost by ∆c = 4.8∆u = $2, 400 to reflect
the dollar equivalent reduction in utility faced while single and studying at college.
Given these changed values for both u and c, computations in our numerical example
yield a reasonably large effect on education. In fact, for both attractiveness types, female
education rates decline by two percentage points, so that the average university education
rate falls from 25 to 23 percent (an eight percent reduction). This change arises as the
estimated (psychic) cost of education increases by 5 percent, from $47,000 to $49,400.
This suggested change in college education rates is consistent with the evidence presented
by Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006). But the interpretation is different: the
pill encourages higher female education rates by reducing the psychic cost of attending
college. Nevertheless without equal opportunities, women would have far less incentive
to invest in a costly college education.
7. Conclusion
This paper makes two significant contributions. First it introduces a new equilibrium
model of search and matching in which men and women have multiple attributes and
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general payoff functions. This new framework is extremely rich and offers considerable
scope for future research. Second, our specific application yields new insights into how
equal labor market opportunities for women and improved contraceptive technologies
affected women’s education and employment decisions as well as the timing of their first
births.
In line with earlier empirical research, our numerical example finds the introduction
of the pill contributed to the rise in female education and labor force participation
rates observed since the 1950s. But we argue those increases would not have occurred
without equal opportunities in the labor market. This is demonstrated by contraceptive
innovations preceding World War II which, with unequal opportunities, had only a very
limited impact on female education rates and female labor supply.
An important, previously undocumented feature of the data is that the distribution
of women’s age at first birth, conditional on having a child, has hardly changed over the
last 150 years. We know, however, that there has also been a steep increase in female
education rates and educated women, on average, delay childbirth by about five years.
Taken together these empirical facts appear inconsistent. The reconciliation is that we
have analyzed the distribution of age at first birth conditional on having at least one
child, i.e., Figure 3 describes the distribution of completed spells, while women who
heavily invest in education are more likely to remain childless (Rowland 2007; Gobbi
2013). Although beyond the scope of the current paper, this raises an interesting and
potentially important issue for future research.
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Appendix
Our data sources, which we use for the discussion in the Introduction and the numerical
exercise in Section 6, come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of
the decennial censuses (Ruggles et al. 2010) and the National Survey of Family Growth
(NSFG).
IPUMS — We use decennial censuses from 1850 to 2000 (1890 is missing), and the 2009
American Community Survey sample, which is a 1 percent national random sample of
the population. Direct information on age at first birth is not available. We therefore
construct it using the variable ELDCH (age of the eldest own child in household) in
conjunction with BIRTHYR (year of birth) and AGE. Detailed information on education,
which is grouped in 12 different categories in the variable EDUC, is not available before
the 1940 Census. Data on labor force participation come from the variable LABFORCE
and cover all census years with the exception of 1850, in which the information for women
is not recorded. For our analysis we select only women who are aged between 15 and 44
for the age at first birth statistics (or aged between 25 and 34 for the education and labor
market statistics). The sample size therefore varies across censuses and outcomes. The
smallest sample is for labor force participation in 1860 with just under 15,000 women
(Figure 1), while the largest is for age at first birth in 2000 with over 3 million women
(Figure 3).
Figure 1 shows the trends in the proportion of women aged 25–34 who are in paid
employment, expressed in percentage terms. Unemployed women and women who are out
of the labor force in that age range are in the base category. Besides all women, the figure
also shows the trends for mothers and for women who are single and never married.15
The red vertical lines are drawn in correspondence of the diffusion of birth technology
improvements. That is, the 1860 line corresponds to vulcanized rubber condoms, which
followed the invention of vulcanized rubber in 1844 and its application to the production
of condoms in 1855 (Guinnane 2011); the 1940 line represents the 1936 legalization
of contraceptive use for family planning, which followed the introduction of the latex
technology in 1919; the 1965 and 1980 lines capture the diffusion of the pill, which after
the introduction of Enovid in 1960 took time before a full liberalization of access to oral
contraception (Goldin and Katz 2002; Bailey 2006, 2010).
Figure 2 shows the proportion of women aged 25–34 who have a university degree or
higher qualification. Red vertical lines are drawn in correspondence of 1940, 1965 and
1980. Figure 3 reports the distribution of the age at first birth (median, 10th and 90th
percentiles) for all women by mother’s year of birth. These statistics were obtained from
life table analysis (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002). In this case, each of the vertical lines
is predated by 20–25 years to reflect the birth cohorts of women who would have had a
greater exposure to the birth technology improvements.
NSFG — Our analysis uses Cycles 1–7 collected by the National Center for Health
Statistics in 1973, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2006–2010. Each sample contains
information on women aged 15–44.
The surveys for cycles 1–5 (up to 1995) were based on personal interviews conducted
in the homes of a national sample of women in the civilian, noninstitutionalized popu-
15Because data on marital status are available only since the 1880 census and not before, the employ-
ment series for single, never married women can only be constructed from that year onwards.
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lation of the United States. The main purpose of the 1973–1995 surveys was to provide
reliable national data on marriage, divorce, contraception, infertility, and the health of
women and infants. Cycles 1 and 2 (1973 and 1976) collected information only on cur-
rently or formerly married females, so they do not allow us to construct series for single,
never married women.
Cycle 6 (2002), in which both men and women were interviewed, was based on an
area probability sample. The sample represents the household population of the United
States, 15–44 years of age. The survey sample is designed to produce national data, not
estimates for individual states. In-person interviews were completed with 7,643 female
respondents (and 4,928 males). The response rate was 79 percent overall — 80 percent
for females and 78 percent for males. Cycle 7 (2006–2010) is similar to cycle 6, except
that interviews in this case were done 48 weeks of every year for 4 years, from June 2006
through June 2010. This cycle interviewed a nationally representative sample of 22,682
women and men 15–44 years of age living in households in the United States.
Each cycle contains direct information on each of the variables of interest (age at first
birth, education, and labor force participation) in all data collection years. As in the
case of IPUMS, sample sizes vary across outcomes and cycles. The smallest sample is for
the labor force participation series of never married women in 1982 with 507 observations
(Figure 1), while the largest is for age at first birth for the cohort of women born between
1951 and 1955 with over 8,000 observations (Figure 3). As already mentioned, because
cycles 1 and 2 did not sample never married women, the employment rate series in Figure
1 for this group of women starts from cycle 3 (1982). For each of the Figures 1–3, the
same considerations we discussed earlier apply.
As mentioned in the text, the choice of the age cutoff used for the analysis underlying
Figure 3 is driven by data availability. Raising the cutoff to 44 years (the oldest birth
cohort available in the NSFG) does not change the results in Figure 3. Choosing a higher
age cutoff would not be possible in the NSFG, and problematic for the Census data where
direct information on age at first birth must be constructed using mother’s age and the
age of the eldest child living in the household. This child in fact may not be the first
born. In this case, then, the statistics in Figure 3 could be lower bounds. Lowering the
cutoff at ages below 40 reduces the problem related to mother’s co-residence with her
first child, but raises an issue of selection for more recent cohorts of women, especially
those who were more likely to be exposed to the availability of oral contraceptives.
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Table 1: Baseline parameters and functional forms
r 4 percent (per year)
γ 1.04
β 0.48
H(·) Exponential, with parameter δ
Gm(y) Lognormal, with µm = $10.44 and σm = $0.69
[y, y] [$9,608, $135,131]
Gf (α|n) Gm(·) rescaled with α = y/1.04
Gf (n|α) Binomial, with draws from {−n
2
, n
2
}
φ $10,730 per year, per child
u 1/δ
n 1/δ
Proportion of college graduates 0.25
Table 2: Fitted Parameters
Parameter Estimate
λ 6.0 per year
1
δ
$8,900
F − u $47,700
c £47,000.
Table 3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Unmatched Spells
µu σu µe σe
Data – 4.56 – 4.57
Model 4.43 4.48 4.68 4.72
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Figure 1: Female Employment Rate, Women aged 25-34
Sources: IPUMS Census 1850–2000, 2009 ACS sample; NSFG, Cycles 1-7.
Note: See the Data Appendix for a description of the data and the variables used.
Figure 2: Fraction of College Graduate Women, Women aged 25-34
Note: See the note to Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Age at First Birth by Mother’s Birth Cohort
Note: See the note to Figure 1.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Match Rates by Attractiveness Type
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Payoffs by Attractiveness Type, With Unequal and Equal Oppor-
tunities
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